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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:
:

Plaintiff-Respondent.

Case No. 870094

vs.
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING,

Priority 2

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for
Aggravated Robbery, a first-degree felony and for being an
habitual criminal, a first-degree felony, in the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honrable David B. Dee, Judge, presiding.

Jurisdiction is

conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) and Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-26(b)(1) (1953, as amended)
whereby a defendant in a criminal action may take an appeal to
the Supreme Court from a final judgment of conviction of a firstdegree felony.
STATEMENT Qf THE CftSE
Steven Stilling (hereafter "defendant) was convicted by
a jury of aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. S§ 76-6-302 (1953, as amended); and being an
Habitual Criminal in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001
(1953, as amended).

The court sentenced the Defendant to two

concurrent sentences of five years to life at the Utah State
Prison.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This fact situation that underlies this case is
complex.

At the end of this Statement of Facts is a chronology

of events for the Court's reference.
On March 10, 1984, a man matching the description of
Steven Michael Stilling robbed Self's Foodland (hereafter
"Self's") in Salt Lake City armed with a gun.

The robber found

the store manager, John Thomas, in the back room of the store,
threatened the manager with the gun, and had the manager empty
the safe and the checkstands (R. 839). The manager complied with
the robber's demands by walking with him to the front of the
store and emptying the safe, and instructing the two women
operating the checkstands to empty their tills (R. 839-844). Mr.
Thomas was able to see the defendant well enough to pick the
defendant out of a photo lineup given four weeks after the
robbery (R. 880), and made a positive in-court identification
both at preliminary hearing (R. 857) and at trial (R. 848).
Three other witnesses—the two cashiers at Self's that night
(Stacey Lee Roberts, R. 904-915, and Wendy Sheldon, R. 942-970)
and a customer at the store (Dennis Wall, R. 970-980)—also saw
the robber.
Cashier Stacey Lee Roberts testified that she saw the
robber for "Iplrobably about a minute. Maybe two" (R. 911-13),
and gave a general corroborating description of the robber as
being a white male, 5'10" tall, of average weight, wearing a dark
jacket, and having dark, "not very long" hair (R. 911-13)•
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Cashier Wendy Sheldon gave a more detailed
corroborative description of the robber as being a white male,
tall and "kind of slender", with brown hair, wearing a brown
leather jacket, jeans, green and white tennis shoes (R. 947-48).
She also made an in-court identification of the defendant as
being someone who "looks like the person" who robbed Selffs that
night (R. 949), calling her ID "70%" certain (R. 951).
Customer Dennis Wall saw the robber twice—once in the
store and once when the robber came out to Wall's car and spoke
to him.

Wall had noticed, prior to buying his groceries, that he

had not brought his checkbook.

Wall then searched his car, and

when he could not find his checkbook there, he went back in and
informed a cashier that he would have to go home to get his
checkbook.
checkstand.

At that time, he noticed the robber by the
Then

the gentleman that was standing at the end of
the checkstand walked—I just sat down in the
car. The car door was open, and he walked
by, and he said to me, that cashier wants to
see you.
(R. 974)
Wall then went on to describe the robber, substantially
corroborating what had been said by describing the robber as
being a white male, between 5*7" and 5'9", of medium build with
brown hair (R. 974-75) .
Detective Bell of the Salt Lake City Police, Robbery
Section, investigated the robbery of Self's. He interviewed John
Thomas and had Thomas build a composite drawing of the robber (R.
917-18).

Detective Bell then showed Thomas a photo spread which
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did not include a picture of the defendant, and Thomas could not
choose one (R. 920-21).

Bell showed Thomas another photo spread

a month later which included a picture of the defendant*

Thomas

identified the photo of the defendant as being the robber (R.
921-23).

Bell testified that "I believe Mr. Thomas told me he

was positive that this gentleman here was the person who robbed
him [indicating the photo of the defendant]" (R. 924).
On April 25, 1984f the Defendant was arrested in
Portland, Oregon, on fugitive warrants out of Weber County (based
upon charges unrelated to those which are the subject of this
appeal).

On May 11, 1984, the defendant's Oregon parole was

revoked by Oregon authorities and he was committed to the Oregon
State Penitentiary (hereafter "OSP") (R. 45).
Weber County lodged a detainer with OSP against
defendant on the charges under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers, Utah Code Ann. S 77-29-5 et. seq. (1953, as amended)
(hereafter "IAD") (R. 45). On June 27, 1984, Weber County
requested temporary custody of defendant from OSP for prosecution
under Article IV of the IAD (R. 303). On July 12, 1984, Oregon
acknowledged Weber County's request for temporary custody and
sent Weber County the inmate status report required by Article
IV(b) of the IAD.

OSP eventually granted Weber County's request

for temporary custody, and on August 17, 1984, defendant was
transported to Weber County Jail for prosecution on Weber
County's charges (R. 309). He claims no irregularity with these
proceedings under the IAD.
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Meanwhile, sometime before July 23, 1984, Salt Lake
County officials learned that defendant was incarcerated in the
OSP, and lodged detainers on him with the OSP authorities under
the IAD for the charges arising out of the robbery of Self's,
among other robberies (R. 309). Before Salt Lake County
authorities could file their own request for temporary custody of
defendant under Article IV of the IAD, they learned on September
19, 1984, that defendant had been transferred to the Weber County
Jail (R. 109) • Accordingly, on September 19, 1984, Salt Lake
County authorities filed arrest warrants directly on the
defendant while he was being held as a pretrial detainee at the
Weber County Jail

on Weber County's charges (R. 109).

On January 28, 1985, the defendant was brought to Salt
Lake County for preliminary hearing on the Salt Lake charges, and
was returned to Weber County Jail (R. 310)•
On February 8, 1985, the defendant was arraigned in
Third District Court on the Salt Lake charges and was returned to
Weber County Jail (R. 310).
Defendant pled guilty to the Weber County charges on
February 10, 1985, and received a sentence to the Utah State
Prison.

Following these proceedings, he was transported to the

Salt Lake County Jail to await trial on the Salt Lake charges.
Shortly thereafter, on February 21, defendant moved to dismiss
all charges brought against him by Salt Lake County, (R. 184) on
two inconsistent theories:

(1) that Salt Lake officials had not

properly presented an Article IV IAD request for temporary
custody to OSP officials to secure custody to try him; and (2)
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that the 120-day period provided for in Article IV of the IAD in
which prosecutors must bring him to trial had run because Salt
Lake County failed to bring the defendant to trial within 120
days of either his arriving in Utah or of the filing of the
arrest warrants on the defendant at the Weber County Jail on
September 19, 1984.1
Notably, Salt Lake County had never requested temporary
custody of defendant from OSP under Article IV, nor had defendant
ever made a request for disposition of the Salt Lake charges
under Article III of the IAD.

Salt Lake County had merely lodged

a detainer against defendant with Oregon authorities under the
IAD.

Judge David B. Dee agreed with defendant's first theory,

declining to dismiss the charges,2 but ordering that the
defendant be returned to the OSP (R. 108-110).

(See Addendum A.)

The court later clarified its order, articulating that the
defendant could not then be tried in Salt Lake County, because
the Salt Lake County officials had never sought nor received

* The latter argument would clearly be frivolous if the former
argument prevailed for if there had not been an Article IV
request for temporary custody, the 120-day period under article
IV would never have commenced.
* Unfortunately, the court's order states that all proceedings
are dismissed and the defendant is ordered back to OSP. However,
when read in context with the judge's findings and conclusions,
it is clear he merely found that Salt Lake had improperly gained
custody over the defendant because no request for temporary
custody had been made on OSP officials. He did not find that
Utah lacked jurisdiction over the defendant on the charges and he
reserved ruling on defendant's other issue until he could be
returned to Utah (R. 108-110). (See Addendum A.) Indeed, after
defendant was returned, he renewed his prior motion, thus
indicating that the case had not, in fact, been previously
dismissed.
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authority from the Oregon officials to dispose of the Salt Lake
County charges before his return to OSP under Article IV of the
IAD,

(R. 108-10) • The court, in anticipation that defendant

would be returned to Utah under the IAD or by extradition,
reserved ruling on the 120-day issue of defendant's Motion to
Dismiss under Article IV(c) of the IAD (R. 614). The defendant
was ordered sent back to the OSP (R. 110)•
Prior to May 17, 1985, defendant was paroled from the
OSP and was returned to Utah to start serving his sentence on the
Weber County convictions.

Upon motion of the State, trial on the

Salt Lake County cases was reset for July 15, 1985 (R. 91).
Defendant, through his counsel, filed a legion of
pretrial motions, delaying the start of trial until May 5, 1986
(R. 1547 (two motions), 1587, 1616 (four motions), 1669, etc.).
One of the motions made on June 12, 1985, renewed the claim that
Salt Lake County had violated Article IV of the IAD by not trying
him within 120 days after the arrest warrants were served on him
at the Weber County Jail (R. 93)• Defendant further contended
that because he was available to Salt Lake County for prosecution
while he was in Utah, the 120-day period should be deemed to have
commenced from the time the arrest warrants were served (R. 104).
This motion was denied (£&£. Addendum B) and defendant petitioned
for an interlocutory appeal in the Utah Supreme Court.
Addenda C and D.

See

The petition was denied by this Court on

October 25, 1985 (&££. Addendum E ) .
On May 14, 1986, a jury found the defendant guilty of
aggravated robbery for the robbery of the Self's food store on
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March 10, 1984 (R. 1067), and the following day found the
defendant not guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person (R. 1132) . The defendant waived the jury for
the determination of the habitual criminal charge, and the trial
judge found the defendant guilty of being an habitual criminal
(R. 1146).

The convictions were entered prior to when this

Court's ruling on State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (June 20 # 1986) was
announced.

After a number of post-trial motions, the judge

finally sentenced the defendant on January 7, 1987, to five years
to life in the Utah State Prison for the aggravated robbery
charge and concurrent five years to life for the habitual
criminal conviction, the sentences running concurrently with the
sentences the defendant was already serving in the Utah State
Prison (R. 1252-1254).

STATE v. STILLING CHRONOLOGY
1984
March 10:

Robbery of Self's is committed,

April 25:

Defendant is arrested in Portland, Oregon on
fugitive warrants out of Weber County.

May 11:

Defendant's Oregon parole revoked and
Defendant is committed to OSP.

June 27:

Weber County requests temporary custody of
defendant from OSP under Article IV of the IAD
based upon a detainer they had previously
lodged with OSP on their charges.

July 12:

OSP approves Weber County's request for
temporary custody.

sometime before
July 23:

Salt Lake County lodges detainer with OSP on
the Self's market robbery charges.
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August 17:

Defendant is transported to Weber County Jail
pursuant to Weber's request for temporary
custody under the IAD.

September 19:

Salt Lake County learns defendant is in Utah
and files arrest warrants against Defendant at
the Weber County Jail.

1985
January 28:

Defendant brought to Salt Lake County for
Preliminary Hearing.

February 8:

Defendant brought to Salt Lake County for
Arraignment. Trial set for March 4.

February 10;

Defendant pleads guilty to charges in Weber
County and is sentenced, ending their
proceedings against him. Defendant is then
transported to Salt Lake County for trial.

February 21:

Defendant moves to dismiss the charges brought
against him by Salt Lake County.

April 10:

Court makes Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law on the motion to dismiss. Defendant is
returned to OSP.

May 17:

Oregon paroled the Defendant and sent him to
the Utah State Prison to begin serving
sentence from Weber County conviction. Salt
Lake County continues where it left off in the
previous prosecution, and files arrest
warrants on Defendant.

June 12:

The Defendant renews motion to dismiss
charges. Trial court denies motion.
1986

May 14-15:

Defendant is convicted of robbery of the
Self's Foodland and of being an habitual
criminal.
1987

January 7:

Defendant sentenced to five years to life in
the Utah State Prison for the aggravated
robbery and a concurrent five years to life
for the habitual criminal charge.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly refused to dismiss the charges
against defendant because there was no violation of the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD").

The purpose behind

the IAD (to enable prisoners to participate in prison
rehabilitational programming free of the constraints of pending
untired criminal charges) is not present in this case. The
Interstate Agreement on Detainers does not apply when the inmate
is being held as a pre-trial detainee awaiting trial on charges.
Salt Lake County never filed for temporary custody
under Article IV of the IAD so as to trigger the running of the
120-day time limits of Article IV.
Even if Article IV of the IAD did applyf the defendant
would not have been "available for trial" to Salt Lake County
while Weber County was disposing of their charges against him,
and so therefore the 120 days could not have begun to run until
Weber County's prosecution was ended.
Assuming Salt Lake County did not properly obtain
temporary custody over the defendant under the provisions of the
IAD at the time of his arraignment and preliminary hearing on the
Salt Lake County charges, the jurisdiction of the lower court's
at that time was not defeated and there was no need to rearraign
him or accord him another preliminary hearing on those charges.
The defendant's right to a speedy trial was not
violated.

First, the concerns behind the speedy trial provisions

are not present in this case, as the defendant was serving jail
time on other charges when Salt Lake County proceedings were
brought against him.
-10-

Assuming, arguendo, that the purposes behind the speedy
trial provisions were present, the facts of the case show that
the delays in starting trial were not because of any intentional
actions on the part of the State.
The trial judge's refusal to give a cautionary
eyewitness identification warning to the jury was within his
discretion and did not constitute error.

This Court has

expressly made the instructions mandated in State v. Long, 721
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) , prospective rather than retroactive.

The

view that cautionary eyewitness identification instructions rises
to the level of Constitutional deprivation of rights has not been
shared by this Court, nor by the federal courts. Rather, the
mandating of cautionary eyewitness identifications has been done
as an exercise of the Courts1 supervisory capacity over the trial
courts.
Finally, the trial court sentenced the defendant
correctly under the Habitual Criminal Statute, Utah Code Ann. S
76-8-1001 (1953, as amended).

The clear language of the statute,

buttressed by similar sentencing since the passage of the statute
and this Court's clear approval of the statute, indicate that the
trial court did what was statutorily mandated and judicially
sound in sentencing the defendant as it did.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO DISMISS
THE CHARGES AGAINST DEFENDANT BECAUSE THERE
WAS NO VIOLATION OF THE INTERSTATE AGREEMENT
ON DETAINERS, UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-29-5
(1953), AS AMENDED.
At the outset, it must be noted that the purpose of the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Utah Code Ann. S 77-29-5
(1953, as amended), (hereafter "IAD"), is to provide a mechanism
for prisoners serving a term of imprisonment to insist upon
speedy and final disposition of untried charges that are the
subjects of detainers so that prison rehabilitation programs
initiated for a prisoner's benefit will not be disrupted or
precluded by the existence of the untried charges.

Article I of

IAD; People v. Hioinbotham. 712 P.2d 993, 997 (Colo. 1986)
(citations omitted).

Accord, Cuyler v. Adams. 449 U.S. 433, 448-

49 (1981); U.S. v. Currier. 836 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1987).

The

provisions of the IAD are to be liberally construed so as to
effectuate this underlying purpose.

Article IX of IAD. The

facts of this case reflect that defendant, due to his extensive
criminal activity in multiple jurisdictions, was hardly in a
position to participate in prison rehabilitational programming at
OSP during the period of time Salt Lake County was diligently
seeking to bring him to trial.

Defendant, for the most part, was

being held as a pre-trial detainee in the Weber County Jail
during

the critical period in issue, and not incarcerated in a

facility where rehabilitation programs were even available to
him.

(Defendant does not contest the lawfulness of his
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incarceration in Weber County.)

Nor does the IAD apply to

persons housed as pre-trial detainees. Dorsey v. State. 490
N.E.2d 260 (Ind. 1986).

It applies strictly to "a person who has

entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional
institution."

Article III (a) of IAD. Although defendant had

entered on a term of imprisonment at OSP# he was in the temporary
custody of Weber County in the status of a pre-trial detainee at
the time Salt Lake County was seeking him.

Thus, the overriding

purpose of guaranteeing prisoners access to rehabilitational
programing free of untried charges pending over themf is not
really present in this case.

Nevertheless, defendant seeks to

take advantage of a strained interpretation of provisions of the
IAD in an effort to have the charges against him dismissed
without regard for the true purpose behind the IAD.
Secondly, the facts clearly reflect that as soon as
Salt Lake authorities learned of the defendants whereabouts,
they acted diligently and promptly to attempt to bring him to
trial (thus satisfying any speedy trial concerns which might have
arisen).

Yet, defendant seeks to punish Salt Lake County for its

diligence in acting promptly to bring him to trial—the very
interest the IAD was designed to protect.

At most, Salt Lake

County can be criticized for trying to act too promptly to bring
him to trial.

However, it is difficult to see where defendant

has suffered any real prejudice by Salt Lake County's action.
Defendant's proposed reading of certain provisions of the IAD
needs to be reviewed with the above principles in mind.
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Defendant asserts that Salt Lake County's charges
should have been dismissed because he was not brought to trial
within the 120-day period contemplated by Article IV of the IAD.
He contends that because he was "available" to Salt Lake County
during the time he was in Utah being held on the Weber County
charges, the 120-day period should be deemed to have commenced
either upon his arrival in Utah or at least when Salt Lake County
served its warrant on him.
the terms of the IAD.

This interpretation goes far beyond

Article IV, unlike Article III, was

intended to provide a remedy for prosecutors to bring prisoners
to trial during the period of the prisoner's incarceration in
another state's jurisdiction (to avoid the case becoming state,
etc.).

Article IV is the prosecutor's half of the IAD.

Q£«

Brown v. District Court. 571 P.2d 1091, 1092-93 (Colo. 1977)
(purpose of IAD is to provide expeditious, simplified method of
disposing of outstanding criminal charges.

As such, it is

generally designed to benefit the states, not the prisoners)•
Any right a defendant might have to get charges disposed of lies
within Article III of the IAD.3

Article IV entitles prosecutors

in a state where untried charges are pending, if they so choose.
to acquire temporary custody of a prisoner against whom they have
lodged a detainer.

Under Article IV, if the prosecutor makes a

request for temporary custody, trial proceedings roust be
commenced "within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the
3 Article III authorizes a defendant, if he or she so chooses, to
request disposition of the detainer by the jurisdiction where the
untried charges are pending. Defendant never made such a request
in this case.
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receiving state."

In the instant case, it is undisputed that

Salt Lake County never made a formal request on OSP authorities
under Article IV of the IAD for temporary custody of defendant.
Indeed, in his initial motion to Judge Deer defendant
successfully asserted this position which led to defendant's
return to OSP and a cessation of the Salt Lake prosecution.4
This ruling clearly comports with the provisions of Article IV of
the IAD.

Without such a request, the 120-day period of Article

IV was never triggered.
Article IV(b) does provide that if a prosecutor in a
particular state makes a request for temporary custody under
Article IV, the prison authorities shall furnish that prosecutor
in the receiving state with a certificate stating the current
status of the prisoner (e.g. the term of the prisoner's
commitment, time already served, time remaining to be served,
good time earned, etc.) . Article IV(b) also requires that the
prison authorities "simultaneously shall furnish all other
officers and appropriate courts in the receiving state who have
lodged detainers against the prisoner with similar certificates

4

Judge Dee stated that Salt Lake County had lodged a detainer
with OSP and that Salt Lake County, by transferring defendant
from Weber County to Salt Lake County, without first filing a
request for temporary custody pursuant to Article IV(a) of the
IAD violated the terms of the IAD. In his later Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal, defendant expressly stated that he "does
not contest the propriety of Judge Dee's conclusions of law" on
this finding. Defendant's latest claim that the 120 days should
be deemed to have run because he was "available" for prosecution
to Salt Lake County flies in the face of his earlier argument
that he was not available for prosecution and should have been
returned to OSP because an Article IV request had not been made
by Salt Lake authorities.
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and with notices informing them of the [other prosecutor's]
requests for custody or availability and of the reason therefor."
£££ al££ Boyd v. State. 441 A.2d 1133 (Md. App. 1982); People v.
&ax&&Ri 414 N.Y.S.2d 473, 476 (N.Y. 1979).

The record does not

disclose whether or not OSP officials formally served Salt Lake
County with this certificate of inmate status.

Assuming they

did, this would not obligate Salt Lake County to do anything
under the IAD.

There is absolutely no requirement that a

prosecutor ever make a request for temporary custody under
Article IV.

One receiving state prosecutor's decision to

prosecute charges and obtain temporary custody of a defendant
under Article IV(a) is in no way binding on other prosecutors in
the receiving state.
Mass. 1979). 5

Fasano v. Hall, 476 F. Supp. 291 # 293 (D.C.

Article IV(b) is provided merely as an

informational courtesy to other prosecutors in the receiving
state to file for temporary custody if they so choose.

Salt Lake

County never chose to file for temporary custody under Article IV
to trigger Article IV's time provisions.

Article IV does not

create a right of disposition of charges for a prisoner only
Article III does that.

While it is true that when Salt Lake

County eventually learned that the defendant was in the Weber
County Jail, they attempted to take custody to commence their
prosecution of him before his return to Oregon, this action
cannot be construed as an invokation of the provisions of Article

5 The decision of the district court was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, Fasano v. Hall. 615 F.2d 555 (1st Cir. 1980), CfiZLt*
dfiHifilf 449 U.S. 867 (1980)•

•16-

IV. and Judge Dee so found.

Article IV(a) requires the

prosecutor to present "a written request for temporary custody or
availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which
the prisoner is incarcerated" and further requires "the court
having jurisdiction of such • . . information" to have "duly
approved, recorded, and transmitted the request."

Article IV(a)

then gives the prisoner 30 days to seek intervention by his
governor who determines whether or not to honor the prosecutor's
request.

Salt Lake County's actions in directly serving its

warrant on defendant in the Weber County Jail bear no resemblance
to these procedures.

Accordingly, Salt Lake County was precluded

from continuing to proceed against defendant until the procedures
of the IAD were properly complied with.

Article IV clearly was

never invoked in defendant's case so as to trigger its 120-day
provisions.
Assuming OSP did not issue an inmate status certificate
to Salt Lake County officials under Article IV(b) to notify them
of defendant's temporary transfer to Utah, such would not provide
a basis for dismissal of the charges against defendant.
WUUfrmg Vt gtate, 426 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. App. 1983) ,

petition fat review djanjjed., 437 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1983), contains
facts virtually identical to the instant case.

Marion County,

Florida, obtained temporary custody of defendant from a New York
prison to prosecute.

New York prison officials failed to notify

Union County, Florida, of the prisoner's availability as provided
in Article IV(b) of the IAD.

After his conviction in Marion

County, the prisoner was returned to New York.
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He was later sent

to the Florida State Prison at which time Union County, Florida,
commenced its proceedings against him on their charges.
Defendant moved to dismiss claiming that because he was available
for trial when he was previously in Marion County, Florida,
Article IV's 120-day time limit had run.

The court found:

It is clear that the New York authorities
failed to give notice to Union County that
Williams was being brought to Florida as
required by [Article IV(b) which] states that
[i]n respect of any proceeding made possible
by this subsection, trial shall be commenced
within 120 days of the arrival of the
prisoner in the receiving state..••
***

[W]e fail to see why the State of Florida
should be denied the right to enforce its
criminal laws because of the oversight of the
State of New York.
Id. at 1122.

In State v. Barefield. 735 P.2d 1339 (Wash. App.

1987), the court found that the failure of prison officials in
the sending state to comply with provisions of the IAD should not
result in dismissal of charges in the receiving state.

It

reasoned that:
Having considered the foregoing cases, we
conclude that Congress intended sanctions to
be applied only where they are expressly
allowed under the IAD. To conclude otherwise
would result in ad hoc determinations by
individual member states determining whether
officials had acted 'promptly1• It is for
Congress, not the courts, to set time limits
for giving notice and for forwarding
materials. We, therefore, hold that
dismissal under the IAD is not mandated in
this case.
& • Colt v. State. 440 So. 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (IAD
prompt notice provisions directory; violation does not result in
dismissal of charges); State v. Clark. 222 Kan. 65, 563 P.2d 1028
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(1977) (IAD prompt notice provision directory; IAD has no
sanction for failure to comply); Commonwealth v. Gonce* 320 Pa.
Super. Ct. 19, 466 A.2d 1039 (1983) (dismissal allowed only under
explicit provisions of the IAD.)
As noted above, because prosecutors are not obligated
by Article IV to request temporary custody of a prisoner, there
was no requirement that Salt Lake County pursue an Article IV
request after defendant was returned to OSP. Moreover, the
defendant certainly was not precluded from seeking prompt
disposition of those charges by filing his own request under
Article III of the IAD.

This he chose not to do.

It was

appropriate for Salt Lake authorities to await defendant's return
to Utah to serve his Weber County sentence before resuming its
prosecution against him.

The amount of time from when defendant

was returned to the OSP until he was paroled to the Utah State
Prison was approximately one month (April 10 - May 17, 1985) (R.
311), hardly time enough to justify Salt Lake County going
through the motions of requesting temporary custody of defendant.
Once he was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison the terms of
the IAD no longer applied, and any remedy for prompt disposition
of any other Utah charges pending against him would lie under
Utah Code Ann. S 77-29-1 (1953), as amended.

Petitioner did not

avail himself of this provision.
Assuming the 120-day provision of the IAD did apply,
there is serious doubt whether defendant was always "available"
for prosecution to Salt Lake County during the entire time he was
being held in the Weber County Jail.
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Clearly, he was not

available while Weber County was disposing of its charges against
him.

It is unrealistic to assume that the 120-day period should

be running at all times defendant was in Utah or even after he
had been served with Salt Lake County's warrant.

Article VI(a)

of the IAD provides that:
In determining the duration and expiration
dates of the time periods provided in
articles III and IV of this agreement, the
running of said time periods shall be tolled
whenever and for as long as the prisoner is
unable to stand trial, as determined by the
court having jurisdiction of the matter.
See United States v. Roy. 830 F.2d 628, 634-35 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Article VI exempts from the governance of the IAD time when
prisoner is unable to stand trial; time when prisoner was in
state to stand trial on federal charges, he was "unable to stand
trial" on state charges (citing Young v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 339,
343)).

Until the charges in Weber County were settled, defendant

was not able to stand trial in Salt Lake County.
sense from a policy standpoint.

This makes

If a defendant were facing

charges from every single county in Utah, and all of them had
lodged detainers with the Oregon State Prison, they could not all
be expected to bring the defendant to trial within the same 120
days.

Defendant was "unable to stand trial" until charges

against him were clear in the first jurisdiction gaining custody
of him.

The charges against defendant were not resolved and he

was not available for trial until he entered his guilty plea and
was sentenced in Weber County on February 13, 1985. Between the
time that the guilty plea was entered (Feb. 13) and the defendant
moved to dismiss Salt Lake County's charges (Feb. 21), just over
one week had elapsed.
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Finally, petitioner claims United States v. Mauro, 436
U.S. 340 (1978), mandates dismissal of the Salt Lake charges.

He

claims that once the application of the IAD is triggered (i.e.,
when Salt Lake County filed its detainer with Oregon Correctional
authorities) , then the 120-day period commences when the
"receiving State" initiates disposition of its charges.

He

overreads both the IAD and HaiULQ>
The Mauro court (in Mr. Ford's case) merely held that
the United States is a party to the IAD, and that when the
federal government lodges a detainer with a State correctional
official requesting that a State prisoner be made available for
prosecution, and obtains custody by way of a writ of habeas
corpus ai prosequendum instead of the use of a request for
temporary custody, it has effectually activated Article IV of the
IAD and it must bring the prisoner to trial within 120 days as
required by Article IV(c).

With the detainer already lodged with

the correctional officials, the writ was viewed as tantamount to
a "written request for temporary custody" within the meaning of
Article IV(a).

Mr. Ford, unlike petitioner, had also made

repeated requests for a speedy trial.

In petitioner's case, no

semblance of any request for temporary custody was ever made by
Salt Lake officials on Oregon officials.
never triggered at all*
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Thus, Article IV was

POINT II
ASSUMING SALT LAKE COUNTY DID NOT PROPERLY
OBTAIN TEMPORARY CUSTODY OVER THE DEFENDANT
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE IAD AT THE TIME
OF HIS ARRAIGNMENTS AND PRELIMINARY HEARING
ON THE SALT LAKE COUNTY CHARGESf THE
JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURTS AT THAT TIME
WAS NOT DEFEATED AND THERE WAS NO NEED TO
REARRAIGN HIM OR ACCORD HIM ANOTHER
PRELIMINARY HEARING ON THOSE CHARGES.
Defendant asserts that because (1) Judge Dee had ruled
that Salt Lake County officials had improperly obtained custody
over defendant when they served him with warrants while he was in
Weber County Jail rather than properly requesting temporary
custody from Oregon officials under Article IV of the IAD; and
(2) because Judge Dee dismissed all Salt Lake County proceedings
at that time and ordered defendant returned to Oregon, it was
necessary to rearraign defendant and provide him with another
preliminary hearing when proceedings were reinitiated after his
transfer to the Utah State Prison.

Otherwise, defendant claims

the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try him.
As previously notedf it is not totally clear that Judge
Dee, in fact, intended to dismiss all proceedings against
defendant rather than merely stay them when he initially ruled on
defendant's motion to dismiss the charges on April 10, 1985.
Despite the unfortunate language in his Order dismissing the
"proceedings11 (as opposed to charges) , his findings of fact and
conclusions of law indicate an intent to return defendant to
Oregon but not to vacate all proceedings which had already
occurred on the Salt Lake County charges.
Conclusions of Law, he stated:
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In his April 10

Salt Lake County now cannot legally obtain
custody of the defendant for trial on the
above charges by simply serving him with
warrants while he is in Utah temporarily
pursuant to the Weber County request for
temporary custody.
(Emphasis added.)

(See Addendum A ) .

Later, when defendant

renewed his prior motion to dismiss, Judge Dee issued new
Findings and Conclusions on September 25, 1985, stating that:
[T]his Court declined to dismiss these cases
but ordered that defendant be returned to the
custody of the Oregon State officials pending
proceedings under either Article III or
Article IV, IAD....
£££ Addendum B.

See jalsa (R* 611-12) .

In any event, defendant appears to be confusing
"custody" with "jurisdiction".

The fact that Salt Lake County

prosecutors improperly obtained custody over defendant, did not
deprive the courts before which defendant appeared for
arraignment and preliminary hearing of jurisdiction over him.
Nor did irregularities in the earlier proceedings as to
defendant's custody deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to
try him.
The manner in which a court gains jurisdiction over a
defendant does not affect the validity of the judgment against
him.

in Frisbie Vt Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 s.
Ct. 509 (1952), the Supreme Court stated:
This Court has never departed from the
rule announced in Ker v. Illinois* 119
U.S. 436, 444, 7 S. Ct. 225, 229, 30 L.
Ed. 421 (1886), that the power of a court
to try a person for crime is not impaired
by the fact that he had been brought
within the court's jurisdiction by reason
of a "forcible abduction". No persuasive
reasons are now presented to justify
-23-

overruling this line of cases. They rest
on the sound basis that due process of law
is satisfied when one present in court is
convicted of crime after having been
fairly apprised of the charges against him
and after a fair trial in accordance with
constitutional procedural guidelines.
There is nothing in the Constitution that
requires a court to permit a guilty person
rightfully convicted to escape justice
because he was brought to trial against
his will. (Footnotes omitted.)
Here the record reflects that defendant was
convicted "after a fair trial in accordance
with constitutional safeguards." That he was
brought before the Utah court in the face of
a pending proceeding in California attacking
his extradition does not impair his
conviction.
State v. Anderson. 618 P.2d 42 (Utah 1980).

£££ 9l?P BrPWH Vt

District Court. 571 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Colo. 1977).
In State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), this
Court found that even assuming defendant had been illegally
arrested, the court was not deprived of jurisdiction:
A majority of courts have followed "the
established rule that illegal arrest or
detention does not void a subsequent
conviction. Gerstein v. Pugh. 420 U.S. 103,
119, 95 S. Ct. 854, 865, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54
(1975) (citing Frisbie Vt Collins* 342 U.S.
519, 72 S. Ct. 509, 96 L. Ed. 541 (1952), and
Ker V, ZUinPiSr H 9 U.S. 436, 7 S. Ct. 225,
30 L. Ed. 421 (1886)). This Court followed
that line of cases in State v. Beck. Utah,
584 P.2d 870 (1978). That opinion states:
"The 'probable cause1 required for a warrant
of arrest, if lacking, may prevent the
introduction of illegally seized evidence at
the trial, but it does not prevent the trial
and conviction of the defendant." Id., at 872
***

In Gerstein. the Court viewed the probable
cause requirement for arrest warrants as a
protection against illegal detention.
Therefore, once the risk of illegal detention
-24-

has dissipated, i.e., by the time a trial has
been heldf the protection is no longer
relevant or necessary because other
constitutional safeguards have come into
play. Under this analysis, the probable
cause requirement for an arrest warrant
becomes moot by the time a defendant has been
convicted because the much more stringent
requirements of proof at trial have been
employed to protect the defendant.
We are convinced that the "protection"
analysis employed by the Supreme Court in
Gerstein is valid, and we reject the position
that the probable cause requirement for
arrest warrants is jurisdictional. We note
that the only prejudice to the defendant
resulting from what may have been an invalid
arrest was that period of detention he
experienced prior to preliminary examination
and judicial determination of probable cause
for trial. In light of his subsequent
conviction, that temporary period of possibly
wrongful detention is of minimal significance
and does not warrant reversal of an otherwise
valid conviction.
Id. at 271-72.
Thus, even if Salt Lake County had not properly
obtained custody over defendant when he was arraigned and when
the preliminary hearing was held, the courts did not lack
jurisdiction over him when these stages of the criminal
proceedings occurred.

There was no need to duplicate these

proceedings before proceeding to trial, and the trial court so
found when it denied defendant's motion to remand the case to
circuit court (R. 313). The State does not dispute the
importance of the preliminary hearing and arraignment stages of
the criminal process. But the defendant was clearly given a fair
"examination and commitment by a magistrate", Utah Constitution,
Art. 1, Section 13, and was given a preliminary hearing in accord
with the provisions of Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-7(C)(d)(1) .
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POINT III
THE DEFENDANTS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WAS
NOT VIOLATED
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the United
States Constitution, Amendment VI; Utah Constitution, Article I.
Section 12. £££ alsja Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(f) (1953, as
amended).

The right is:
...not primarily intended to prevent
prejudice to the defense caused by passage of
time; that interest is protected primarily by
the Due Process Clause and by statutes of
limitations. The speedy trial guarantee is
designed to minimize the possibility of
lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to
reduce the lesser, but nevertheless
substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on
an accused while on bail, and to shorten the
disruption of life caused by arrest and the
presence of unresolved criminal charges.

United States v. McDonald * 456 U.S. l, 8 (1982).

The focus is on

the impairment or "restraint on personal liberty, disruption of
employment, strain on financial resources, and exposure to public
obloguy. ..."

id., at 9.

U.S. 307, 320 (1971).

See al££, United States v. Marion, 404

Similarly, in State v. Weddle. 506 P.2d

67, 68 (Utah 1973), this Court noted that:
The right to a speedy trial assured by our
Constitution refers, of course, not to the
speed at which trial proceeds, but rather to
the right of an accused to be brought to
trial without undue delay. This is a right
of ancient origin which arose because of
abuses wherein people were kept in custody
for unreasonable periods of time without
trial and even without knowing any abuse of
that character. But in the absence thereof,
it should not be extended as a mere
abstraction of law in circumstances where
there is no justification for its
application. The statement itself is general
and there is no particular length of time
which can be specified as a standard in all
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instances in order to avoid infringement of
the right. The correct application of the
principle depends upon the facts of each
case. The total picture should be looked at
to see whether there has been any such abuse
of imposition upon the accused as the
provision was designed to protect against, so
that he was prejudiced in having a fair trial
and just treatment under the law.
In State V> Archuleta, 577 P.2d 547 (Utah 1977), this Court
stated:
The purpose of those constitutional
provisions is to guard against any
intentional delay which may be oppressive or
prosecutorial in nature. U.S. v. Ewell. 383
U.S. 116, 86 S. Ct. 773, 15 L. Ed. 2d 627
(1966) .
I&. at 548.
The concerns behind speedy trial provisions are not
present in the instant case.

The defendant was already serving

time in the OSP when Salt Lake County lodged detainers against
him, and he was serving time in the Utah State Prison for crimes
committed in Weber County at the time of his trial.

Under such

circumstances, the concerns for loss of liberty, disruption of
employment, strain on financial resources (especially since he
was using the services of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders
Association) and exposure to public obloguy are clearly
nonexistent.
Assuming the purposes behind the speedy trial
provisions were present in this case, the facts of each case
should be reviewed.

The United States Supreme Court has noted

that whether the federal speedy trial right has been violated is
determined by balancing the "...length of delay, the reason for
the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice
-27-

to the defendant*

Barker v. Winoo. 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).

Similar considerations also apply to the Utah Constitution.
State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187f 1193 (Utah 1984) (disavowed for
different reasons in State v. Ossana. 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987);
State v. Knill. 656 P.2d 1026f 1029 (Utah 1982); State Vt
Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982); State v. Hafen, 593
P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1979); State v. Giles. 576 P.2d 876, 879
(Utah 1978).

This Court elaborated on the above factors in

Weddle as follows:
In making that determination, where there has
been what may appear to be undue delay, it is
important to consider whether or not there
was justification for it including: (1)
which party caused it; (2) whether it may
have been willful and/or for some improper
purpose; (3) whether the defendant was aware
of his rights; (4) whether he made known his
desire for a speedy trial; (5) whether by
words or conduct there was explicit or
implicit waiver; and (6) whether the
proceeding was completed as soon as
reasonably could be done in the
circumstances.
Weddle, 506 P.2d at 68. Application of these factors
demonstrates no violation of defendant's speedy trial rights.
The defendant was transported to the Weber County Jail
on August 17, 1984, on the basis of a detainer and a request for
temporary custody that was filed with OSP by Weber County.
Between that time and February 13, 1985, the defendant was
awaiting the disposition of the charges against him by the Weber
County authorities and was, in the interpretation by United
States v. Roy. 830 F.2d at 634, "unable to stand trial" in Salt
Lake County.
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By the time the defendant was able to stand trial, the
defense counsel moved for dismissal of the case (R. 184). This
was followed by a number of motions from the defense, including
three different substitutions of counsel.

The prosecution did

not file nearly as many motions as the defense did, and the
continuances were accepted by both parties.

In Barker# where the

delay between arrest and trial was over five years with the
conviction still upheld, the Supreme Court stated:
Closely related to length of delay is the
reason the government assigns to justify the
delay. Here, too, different weights should
be assigned to different reasons. A
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in
order to hamper the defense should be weighed
more heavily against the government. A more
neutral reason such as negligence or
overcrowded prisons should be weighed less
heavily but nevertheless should be considered
since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the government
rather than with the defendant., Finally, a
valid reason, such as a missing witness,
should serve to justify appropriate delay.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.

(Footnotes omitted.)

Defendant's unavailability to stand trial mainly
because of the actions of his own counsel should not be weighed
against the government.

There is no evidence in the record of

any intentional delays on the part of the government, either with
the County Attorney's Office or with the trial court, and the
defendant has not shown any such intent.
In State v. Archuleta. 577 P.2d at 548-49 (Utah 1977),
referring to the right of speedy trial, this Court stated:
[T]he court does not lose jurisdiction • •
• unless there is some intentional delay of
an oppressive character, which results in
prejudice to the defendant!.)
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Not only should delays by defense counsel be looked upon as
unoppressive per ££, but also the defendant has not shown
prejudice against him by the delays; in factf the trial court
granted the defendant time for jail time served (R. 1254).

The

issue of prejudice was also addressed in Barker;
Delay is not an uncommon defense tactic. As
the time between the commission of the crime
and trial lengthens, witnesses may become
unavailable or their memories may fade. If
the witnesses support the prosecution, its
case may well be weakened, sometimes
seriously so. And it is the prosecution
which carries the burden of proof. Thus,
unlike the right to counsel or the right to
be free from compelled self-incrimination,
deprivation of the right to speedy trial does
not per se prejudice the accused's ability to
defend himself.
Barker. 407 U.S. at 521-22.

In the instant case, the State's

case was comprised totally of witnesses and police, whereas the
defense relied on videotaped depositions taped at a given time
and not subject to the same threat of fading memory, etc. listed
in fcaiJlfil.*
Evaluation of the prejudice suffered by the defendant
should be assessed in light of the interests which the speedy
trial right was designed to protect*

Those interests are not

present where the defendant is serving a sentence for a prior
conviction, and he receives credit for time served as well.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE A
CAUTIONARY EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION WARNING
TO THE JURY WAS WITHIN HIS DISCRETION AND DID
NOT CONSTITUTE ERROR.
Defendant claims that he was deprived of due process of
law by the trial court's refusal to give his requested cautionary
eyewitness identification instruction to the jury.

Defendant

bases this claim on the holding in State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483
(Utah 1986), wherein this Court held that such cautionary
instructions on eyewitness identification were mandatory.
The Court's ruling in Long was expressly made
prospective to cases tried after Long.
before Long was decided.

Defendant was tried

Neverthelessf he claims that the

issuing of cautionary eyewitness identification instructions in
cases where eyewitness testimony is crucial is of Constitutional
proportions, and therefore is a denial of due process for Long to
be applied prospectively only.
The view that eyewitness identification instruction is
of such constitutional magnitude has not been shared by the
federal courts. While most of the federal circuits have endorsed
the use of some kind of eyewitness instruction in some cases,
none of these courts have done so on the theory of due process,
but rather as an exercise of their supervisory capacity over the
district courts.
The Third Circuit was the first to adopt an eyewitness
instruction requirement, and in selecting its model instruction,
it turned to Pennsylvania state law.

It did so as an exercise of

its supervisory capacity over the district courts, and made no
-31-

mention of due process whatsoever*

See United States v. Barberr

442 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1971) , ££i_t. d£Hi£d# 404 U.S. 846 (1971).
Circuit courts following Barber that have addressed the
issue of eyewitness instruction have all recognized that their
holdings apply only to federal district courts.

Seen United

States v. Kavenaah, 572 F.2d 9, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1978) (First
Circuit joins "eight other circuits in approving use of the
Barber chargef or variations of it# in the discretion of the
district court, in cases where the evidence suggests a possible
misidentification," notes that the Barber charge was adopted by
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals from Pennsylvania state law
and implemented in that circuit under the court of appeals's
supervisory power over the district courts, and deems failure to
give the instruction in this case harmless error); United States
v. Montelbano, 605 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1979) (Second Circuit
approves of an instruction but leaves the decision of when it is
required to the discretion of the district court); United States
v, Wilford. 493 F.2d 730, 733 (3d Cir.) Q&JLL.

felll&l,

419 U.S.

851 (1974) (Second Circuit adopted the Barber instruction in
exercise of it supervisory power over district courts; district
court in this case did not commit reversible error in failing to
give the instruction ana sponte): United States v. Revels. 575
F.2d 74, 76 (4th Cir. 1978) (decision on whether or not to give
the instruction is the district court's; failure to give it here,
if error, was harmless); United States v. Ramirez-Rizo. 809 F.2d
1069, 1072 (5th Cir.

1987) (district court acted within

discretion in refusing to give requested instruction); United
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States v. Boyd, 620 F.2d 129, 131 (6th Cir. 1980) cert* denied*
449 U.S. 855 (1980) (identification instructions are within the
discretion of the district court); United States v. Hodges. 515
F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975) (giving of instruction is mandatory when
identification is central issue and instruction is requested);
United States v. Cain, 616 F.2d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1980)
(eyewitness instruction is approved of, and failure of the
district court to give it may result in reversible error in some
cases); United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 872 (9th Cir. 1980)
(the giving of an eyewitness instruction is in the discretion of
the district courts); United States v. Thoma, 713 F.2d 604, 607-8
(10th Cir. 1983) (in district court cases where identification is
at issue, the court must instruct the jurors specifically that
they must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that "it was the
defendant on trial who had committed the acts alleged11, quoting

HcGee Vt United States, 402 F.2d 434, 436 (10th Cir. 1968), s&x±.
denied. 394 U.S. 908 (1969), in cases where more specific
eyewitness instructions are refused, the Tenth Circuit reviews on
a case by case basis) Q&X±.

denied, 464 U.S. 1047 (1984); United

States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (use of
the Barber-type instruction is in the discretion of the district
courts).
The only federal cases mentioning due process in
connection with an eyewitness instruction are habeas corpus
cases, in which the courts of appeal must rely on the
Constitution to determine the adequacy of the basis for the
petitioner's confinement under 28 U.S.C. S 2254. S&&. e.g. Love
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Yt Young # 781 F.2d 1307, 1318 (7th Cir.)# C£JLt. denied, 476 U.S.
1185 (1986) (although the Seventh Circuit has adopted an
identification instruction for trials in federal courts, because
habeas corpus petitioner was attacking the failure of a state
court to give the instruction, he was bound and failed to show
that the failure to give the instruction "so infected the entire
trial that the resulting conviction violates due process");
Cotton v, Armontrout, 784 F.2d 320, 322 (8th Cir. 1986)(8th
Circuit has "suggested" the use of an identification instruction
when there is nothing but eyewitness testimony to identify the
defendant, but there was no constitutional error here because
instructions on the state's burden of proof and on the jury's
duty to determine the credibility of witnesses adequately
protected the petitioner); Williams v. Lockhart, 736 F.2d 1264,
1267 (8th Cir. 1984) (petitioner, challenging the failure of the
state court to give identification instruction, failed to meet
his burden demonstrating that errors in jury instructions were
sufficiently prejudicial to 'support a collateral attack on the
constitutional validity of a state court's judgment [which] is
even greater than the showing required to establish plain error
on direct appeal.'

Henderson v* Kibbe* 431 U.S. 145, 154

(1977).).
There is no argument that would justify treating the
eyewitness instruction thusly.

Even this court's language in the

Long case itself, that the denial of the instruction "could well
deny the defendant due process of law under article I, section 7
of the Utah Constitution," 721 P.2d at 492, is couched in
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ambiguous and uncertain language.

This language has not been

used again since the Long decision in any holding dealing with
eyewitness identification.
Appellants reliance on Griffith v. Kentucky,, 479 U.S.
, 107 S. Ct.

(1987) , is misplaced.

Had this Court felt

bound by Griffith* it could have so held in a case decided after
Griffith was handed down. State V. Pranchr 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah
1988).

In Branch# this Court continued applying the Long

standard prospectively:
In State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986),
we made a detailed analytical consideration
of the reliability of eyewitness testimony
and concluded that "in cases tried from this
date forward, trial courts shall give such an
instruction as requested by the defense."
Id. at 492. This case wasf however, tried
before Long became law. In reviewing cases
tried before Long # we evaluate the
defendants claim under the case law
applicable at the time the defendant was
tried. State v. Jonas. 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah
1986) (summarizing the crucial pre-Long case
law) .
State v. Branch. 743 P.2d at 1190 (Utah 1988).
Furthermore, and in direct relation to the facts of the
case at bar, this Court noted in pranch that:
... there exists a substantial possibility
that defendant has been confused in this case
with his half brother, who closely resembles
him. On the other hand, we have never found

an abuse of discretion when a judge referred
to a cautionary instruction in a case with
more than one eyewitness*
I&. at 1190 (emphasis added) .
In the case before this Court, there was not one but
four eyewitnesses (the store manager, the two cashiers, and the
customer) who saw the robber and who gave corroborative
•35-

descriptions of him.

In cases such as State v. Ouevedo, 735 P.2d

51 (Utah 1987), where the facts show that at the time the events
occurred, it was dark and the defendant was seen for only a few
seconds, this Court found that refusal of cautionary instruction
was not an abuse of discretion.

Therefore, there has been no

abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in the present
case.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT
CORRECTLY UNDER THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL
STATUTE.
On January 30/ 1987, the defendant was sentenced to two
concurrent sentences of five years to life:

one for his

conviction for aggravated robbery; and one for his conviction of
being an habitual criminal.
Utahf like many other states/ has an Habitual Criminal
enhancement provision:
Any person who has been twice convicted/
sentenced/ and committed for felony offenses
at least one of which offenses having been at
least a felony of the second degree or a
crime which/ if committed within the state
would have been a capital felony/ felony of
the first degree/ or felony of the second
degree/ and was committed to any prison mayf
upon conviction of at least a felony of the
second degree committed in this state/ other
than murder in the first or second degree/ be
determined as a habitual criminal and be
imprisoned in the state prison for from five
years to life.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1953/ as amended).
Defendant claims that sentencing him to two different
(albeit concurrent) sentences violated the status nature of the
habitual criminal statute.

The Habitual Criminal statute does
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not direct the sentencing judge to make the habitual criminal
penalty a part of the sentence of any other charges of which the
defendant is found guilty.

The judge simply has the language of

the statute to work with and the clear indication from the
statute that a defendant will be imprisoned for from one to five
years if he is found to be an habitual criminal.
Utah courts have upheld the habitual criminal statute
as written.
As this court held in State v. Bailey. 712 P.2d 281
(Utah 1985):
The habitual criminal statue has consistently
survived constitutional challenge. State v.
£a£Jt£JL# Utah, 578 P.2d 1275, 1277 (1978).
The statute does not create a new crime; it
merely enhances punishment: for the latest
crime in cases where the defendant has been
previously convicted of and sent to prison
for two other felony offenses, id.. This is
consistent with the purpose of Utah's
statute, which is to "make persistent
offenders subject to greater sanctions."
State v, Montaguer Utah, 671 P.2d 187, 190
(1983) .
State v, Bailey. 712 P.2d at 286 (emphasis added) . The Utah
Court of Appeals has held that:
Under section 76-8-1001, upon proof that a
person has been twice convicted, sentenced,
and committed for a felony, one of which is
at least of the second degree, the person may
be sentenced as a habitual criminal for a
period of five years to life.
State v. Thompson. 77 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 41 (1988) (emphasis
added)*

The trial court did what was statutorily mandateed and

judicially sound in sentencing the defendant to a separate
sentence for being found to be an habitual criminal under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1953, as amended).
-37-

CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons and any and all
reasons set forth at oral argument, if there be any, respondent
respectfully requests that this Court sustain the convictions of
the defendant.

7*

DATED thii s _ ^

day of

., 1988.
*

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

£ 7*

day of April, 1988, I

caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) true and exact
copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Respondent to James C.
Bradshaw, Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 333
South Second East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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LISA A. IIAXriCLD (12120) and
\ \ \ •• \.,;,/.•-",' I.) I
TIIOflAS McCORNICK (13827)
' '..-••
"*
Attorneys for Defendants
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF TACT AND
CONCLUSIONS Or LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING,

Case Nos-CCT 83-176;%CR 85-177;
CR 85-178; CR 85-179;
CR 85-180
Honorable David D. Dee

Defendant,

The above-entitled matter cane on reoularly for hearing
on a Motion to Dismiss in the Third Judicial Court•

The State

was represented by James Uousely, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney,
the defendant Steven Stillinqs was present and represented by LISA
A. KAXFIELD and THOMAS McCORMICX of the Legal Defender Association,
and the Honorable David B. Dee was the Judge prcsidinq.
Based upon the evidence and argument at hearinq on the
Motion to Dismiss, the Honorable David B. Dec makes the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The defendant is a prisoner in the Oreqon Penitentiary.

2.

The defendant is in Utah pursuant to a Weber County

"request for temporary custody" under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers, Utah Code annotated (195J as amended) Section 77-29-5.

3.

While the defendant was in the Oregon Prison Salt Lake

County filed a "detainer" against him under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, but never filed a "request for temporary custody".
4. While the defendant was in the Weber County Jail pursuant
to Weber County's "request for temporary custody", Salt Lake County
served him with arrest warrants in the above cases.
5.

Weber County has completed its proceedings against the

defendant.
6.

Defendant claims that Section 77-29-5, grants a juris-

diction only temporary custody of a prisoner for the purpose of
trying him on charges underlying its request for temporary custody.
Since Weber County• s proceedings arc completed and Salt Lake County
has never requested of Oregon "temporary custody" of the defendant,
Salt Lake County cannot legally obtain custody of the accused based
on Weber's request for temporary custody.

Salt Lake County must

allow the prisoner to return to Oregon.
7.

The state maintains that the defendant is legally before

the court on the Salt Lake County charges even without a "request
for temporary custody" because the accused was served with arrest
warrants while present in the state.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Annotated Section 77-29-5 is binding on Salt

Lake County and by filing a detainer against the defendant the
County has triggered its provision*;.
2.

Pursuant to Section 77-29-5 Salt Lake County must file

a detainer andmakca written request of Oregon for "temporary custody"
of the accused to obtain legal custody of hirn for purpose of standing

trial on Salt Lake County charges.
3.

Salt Lake County now cannot legally obtain custody

of the defendant for trial on the above charges by simply serving
him with warrants while ho is in Utah temporarily pursuant to
the Weber County request for temporary custody.
4.

Under the Interstate Agrecnent on Detainers the

defendant should now be returned tp tjS^c State of Oregon.
DATED this

{Q

day of tffrt^+r, 1985.

BY THE COURT

*>VtfGir'DAVin 13. DUE

District Court Judge

c-j7iV-.V,i,V,
^

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

JM1ES IIOUSELY

Deputy County Attorney

• ',

. ! "

)

LISA A. MAXriCI.D
THOMAS MCCORMICK

(#?120)

and

(yc?7)
Attorneys for Defendant:;
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ar.sociaLi.cn
333 South Second Ear.t:
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 1111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THC'DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICAIL DISTRICT
IN AND TOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
AND TRANSI EN

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case Nos.^CRfl:i-J7'j)CR SJ-177;
TK C5-17U; CR 03-179;
CR 8 5-180

vs.
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING,
Defendant.

Based upon the Motion of defendant, the files and records
in this matter, the argument of counsel and the Findings of Tact
and Conclusions of Law hereto filed in this matter,
IT IS ORDERED that all proceedings in the above matters
bo dismissed and that the defendant be returned to Ucbcr County
Jail for the purposes of returning him to the custody of the Oregon
State Penitentiary.
DATED this

/
(O

day of itf&L,

1985.

HY THE COURT:

QaZMUz.
.!T'!<C:E IJAVID H . DEE .

Third District COurt '
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

JAMES HOUSELY
Deouty County Attorney

ADDENDUM B

T.L. "TED" CANNON
Salt Lake County Attorney
JAMES F. HOUSLEY
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 363-7900

CKxAlll^.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OT UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S RENEWED
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING,
Defendant.

Criminal No's^ CR 85-176, QR 85-177,
CR 85-178, CR 85-179,
CR 85-180
JUDGE DAVID B. DEE

The above-entitled cases came on regularly for hearing on
July 16, 1985, upon defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff
being represented by JAMES F. HOUSLEY, Deputy County Attorney, and
the defendant being present and represented by his attorney, THOMAS
J. McCORMICK, and the Court having received Memoranda of Authorities
from counsel concerning their respective positions and having heard
argument of their respective positions and being fully advised in
the premises hereby enters the following:
FINDINGS
1. That the crimes charged in the Informations filed in the
above numbered cases allegedly occurred between March 10th and March
30, 1985;

Findings, Conclusions and Order on Renewed Motion to Dismiss
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2.

That said cases were screened, filed and warrants issued

between May 21st and June 14, 1984;
3.

That on July 12, 1985, Weber County officials requested,

under Interstate Agreement on detainers §77-29-5 , Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended - (hereafter IAD), Oregon State Prison officials to
deliver Defendant to Weber County, Utah for prosecution of him by
Weber County, Utah, for similar offenses, allegedly committed in that
county, having previously filed a detainer on the Defendant on June
14, 1984;
4.

That before July 23, 1984, Salt Lake County officials

learned that Defendant was in the Oregon State Penitentiary, and
lodged detainers on him for the charqes arising out of the five incidents occurring in Salt Lake County;
5.

That on August 17, 1984, Oregon State officials caused

Defendant to be transported to Kcber County for prosecution on the
Weber County charges and that said Oregon officials left blank, in
the accompanying documents, the paragraphs provided to authorize Salt
Lake County to dispose of charges in Salt Lake County;
6.

That on September 19, 1984, Salt Lake County officials

lodged detainers based upon Salt Lake County warrants against Defendant
at Weber County Jail;
7.

On January 14, 1985, Salt Lake County officials brought

Defendant from the Wcbor County Jail to Salt Lake County, without
having first sought, or received, permission of Oregon officials to
receive temporary custody of Defendant as provided in Article IV(a)

Findings, Conclusions and Order on Renewed Motion to Dismiss
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of IAD and without giving Defendant a 30 day opportunity to object
as provided by that Articlef where he was "arraigned" before the
Circiut Court in Salt Lake County sitting as a committing magistrate;
8.

That on January 29, 1985, Salt Lake County officials

brought the Defendant from the Weber County Jail to Salt Lake County,
where a preliminary hearing on the present charges was held before
the Circuit Court in Salt Lake County and then returned him to the
Weber County Jail;
9.

That on February 8, 1985, Salt Lake County officials

brought the Defendant from the Weber County Jail to Salt Lake County,
where he was arraigned in Third District Court on the present charges
and then returned him to the Weber County Jail;
10.

That on February 21, 1985, Defendant moved to dismiss

Salt Lake County charges for failure to bring Defendant to trial
within 120 days;
11.

That prior to March 4, 1985, Defendant filed a Memorandum

articulating his claim that he was entitled to be returned to Oregon,
asserting that Salt Lake County officials never had jurisdiction of
Defendant's person because they had not complied with the Article IV(a),
IAD, requirement that they present a written request for temporary
custody of Defendant, and that he had not had a 30 day period within

Findings, Conclusions and Order on Renewed Motion to Dismiss
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which he might object, and that he was entitled to be returned to
Oregon State Prison before that procedure could be initiated;
12.

That this Court declined to dismiss these cases but

Ordered that Defendant be returned to the custody of the Oregon
State officials pending proceedings under either Article III or Article
IV, IAD, on the ground that the Defendant could not be tried in Salt
Lake County, since the Salt Lake County officials had never sought
nor received authority of the Oregon officials to dispose of the
charges before his return to Oregon State Penitentiary, under Article
IV of IAD;
13.

That before May 17, 1985, Oregon State officials

paroled Defendant to the Weber County hold, and Defendant was then
transferred to the Utah State Prison (hereafter U.S.P) to begin
serving sentences on the Weber County charges;
14.

That defendant has never filed prior to his transporta-

tion to U.S.P., any demand for dispositon of the detainers on the Salt
Lake County charges as required under Article III (a) of the IAD, nor has
he made any demand for disposition of said detainers under the Interstate disposition of detainers provisions §77-29-1, U.C.A. 1953, as
amended since he has been at U.S.P; and
15.

That Salt Lake County officials have never sought

temporary custody of Defendant under Article IV (a), IAD.
CONCLUSIONS
1.

That before the 120 doy period of time provided under

Findings, Conclusions and Order on Renewed Motion to Dismiss
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Article IV(c) , IAD, begins to run the Utah State officials must both
file detainers and request temporary custody of Defendant, and the
Defendant must be accorded the 30 day period to object all as provided
under Article IV(a), IAD;
2.

That before the 180 day period of time provided under

Article III (a), IAD, begins to run, the Utah State officials must
file detainers and the Defendant must make a written request for
final disposition of the charges represented by said detianers as
provided in said Article III (a);
3.

That before the 120 day period of time provided under

§77-29-1(1) and (4), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, begins
to run the Defendant must make a written demand requesting disposition
of the pending charges as provided in §77-29-1(1);
4.

That the aborted effort to bring Defendant to trial on

these Salt Lake County charges while Defendant was in the temporary
custody of the Weber County officials did not constitute a "request
for temporary custody,H written or otherwise, within the meaning of
Article IV(a), IAD,; and
5.

That since no such demand or request, written or otherwise,

has been made, no statutory period of time has begun either under IAD
or §77-29-1.
oimcK
Based upon LIK: foroqoing I indinqs of lact and Conclusions
of Law and good cause nntvarinq it i.s hereby ordered:
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Page 6

1.

It is hereby ORDERED that the Defendant's Renewed

Motion to Dismiss be# and the same hereby is, denied:
2.

and

That trial in cases CR85-176, CR85-177, CR85-178,

CR85-179 and CR85-180 be stayed pending the outcome of defendant's
Petition for Permission to Appeal this interlocutory Order.

DATED this

£ U

day of

J^/Jyf^i

, 1985,

BY THE COURT:

I?

Approved as to form this

t&

day of

Vy~

y

1985.

Attorney toy Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Served the foregoing Findings, Conclusions and Order on
Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss upon the Defendant by mailing
a copy thereof in an envelope, postage prepaid and addressed as
follows, to his attorney on this

Tom McCormick, Esq.
Legal Defenders Association
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

day of

>^V

, 1985.

,**
^>
sn
>^\
/_ ' Y^ *-&££fi~1
JAMES F. HOUSLtV
Deputy County Attorney

ADDENDUM C

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondant,

PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY
ORDER

vs.
STEVEN M. STILLINGS,

Case No.

Defendant/Petitioner.

r ,i 1 ; 1935
OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL1

INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Stillings is charged in Third District Court,
Salt Lake Department with several aggravated robberies and other
crimes in cases numbered CR85-176, CR85-177, CR85-178, CR85-179
and CR85-180.
On August 17, 1984, Mr. Stillings, then an inmate at the
Oregon State Prison, was temporarily transferred to Utah to face
criminal charges in Weber County.

The transfer was effected pursuant

to Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, §77-29-5, Utah
Code Ann. (1982) (hereinafter cited as Agreement).

Prior to the

completion of proceedings in Weber County, Salt Lake County transferred
Mr. Stillings to its jurisdiction for prosecution on the charges in
the above cases. Subsequently, Judge Dee ruled that the transfer
from Weber to Salt Lake Counties violated Article IV(a) of the Agreement and he suspended further proceedings against Mr. Stillings.
The judge ordered that officials return Mr. Stillings to Oregon.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order by Judge David B. Dee,
April 10, 1984, at 3 (hereinafter cited as Findings I ) .
Soon after his return to Oregon, Mr. Stillings was again

transferred to Utah to serve a committment at the Utah State Prison.
The above cases were revived and Mr. Stillings now contends he was rot
tried by Salt Lake County during his initial presence in Utah within
the 120 day period also mandated by Article IV(c) of the Agreement.
He contends that failure entitles him to a dismissal of the present
cases.

Soon after his arrival back in Utah, Mr. Stillings moved

Judge Dee to dismiss these cases based on the above grounds, and
the Judgefs denial of the motion is the basis of this petition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to and during August, 1984, Mr. Stillings was incarcerated in the Oregon State Prison, Salem, Oregon.

Weber County,

on June 14, 1984, and Salt Lake County, on July 23, 1984, filed
separate detainers (arrest warrants) on Mr. Stillings with Oregon
prison officials.

Under the Agreement, once a detainer has been filed,

either the inmate may demand disposition of the charges underlying
the detainer (Article III) or the receiving State may request
temporary custody of the inmate for trial on the charges (Article IV).
Or, the parties can take no action.

If the receiving state opts

to proceed under Article IV, the Agreement requires the inmate be
tried within 120 days of his arrival in the state.
On July 12, 1984, pursuant to Article IV(a) of the Agreement,
Weber County requested temporary custody of Mr. Stillings for prosecution.

Oregon officials made Mr. Stillings available to Utah

officials on August 17, 1984, and on that day he was transported to
the Weber County Jail.

From August 17, 1984 until sometime in April,

.1985, Mr. Stillings remained in Utah, housed either in the Weber or
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Salt Lake County Jails. The Weber County proceedings lasted until
February 13, 1985, on which day Mr. Stillings entered guilty pleas
to reduced charges and was sentenced to three one to fifteen
indeterminate terms in the Utah State Prison.
On September 19, 1984, Salt Lake County initiated its
prosecution of Mr. Stillings by filing arrest warrants with Weber
County Jail officials.

It then transported Mr. Stillings to Salt

Lake County on January 14, January 29, and February 8, 1985, for his
initial appearance, preliminary hearing and arraignment, respectively,
on the above-named cases. At each Salt Lake appearance, Mr. Stillings
moved to dismiss all Salt Lake County cases on the ground that the
120 day period within which he must be tried after arriving in Utah,
dictated in Article IV(c) of the Agreement, had run. After each
appearance, he was immediately returned to the Weber County Jail.
When the Weber County cases ended on February 13, 1985, Mr. Stillings
was relocated in the Salt Lake County Jail.

Trial on the Salt Lake

County cases was set for March 4, 1985 before the Honorable David B.
Dee.
On February 21, 1985, Mr. Stillings moved the District Court
to dismiss the Salt Lake County charges on the grounds that the County
had not followed proper procedures outlined in the Agreement when it
went forward with its prosecution and obtained custody of him.

He

argued that under the Agreement he was entitled to have Oregon officials
review Salt Lake County's desire to prosecute him.

He also reiterated

his argument that the County had failed to bring him to trial within
the 120 day period mandated by the Agreement,
•3-

In response to the Motion to Dismiss, Judge Dee, on April
10, 1985, ruled that Salt Lake County, by transferring Mr. Stillings
from Weber County to Salt Lake County without first filing a request
for temporary custody pursuant to Article IV(a) of the Agreement,
had violated Mr. Stillings right to a review of the transfer by
Oregon's governor as set out in Article IV(a).

In support of his

ruling, Judge Dee found that by filing a detainer on Mr. Stillings
while he was incarcerated in Oregon, Salt Lake County had triggered
application of the Agreement and was bound by its provisons. Findings I
at 2 • Those provisions require such a review.
To satisfy the requirements of the Agreement, Judge Dee orderci
that Petitioner be immediately returned to Oregon. £d. at 3 . The
Judge reserved ruling on the 120 day issue when and if Mr. Stillings was
returned to Utah. Oral Ruling at Hearing on Motion to Dismiss,
March 18, 1985.
Sometime before May 17, 1985, Mr. Stillings was paroled from
Oregon State Prison and returned to Utah to begin serving his committment to the Utah State Prison*

Upon motion of the State, trial on

the Salt Lake County cases was reset for September 3, 1985.
On June 12, 1985, Mr. Stillings renewed his motion to dismiss
based on the unargued aspect of his earlier motion that Salt Lake
County had violated Article IV(c) of the Agreement by not trying him
on its cases within 120 days of his arrival in Utah.

Mr. Stillings

contended that because he was available to Salt Lake County the entire
time he was in Utah, as evidenced by the County's success in transporting him to Salt Lake County for court appearances while the Weber
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County cases were pending, and because Salt Lake County in fact
proceeded with its prosecution against him, the 120 day period
should have commenced against Salt Lake County upon his arrival
in Utah.

He argued additionally that the Oregon officials, when

they were served with Salt Lake County1s detainer, should hav&
informed Salt Lake County of Weber County's request for tempetary
custody and authorized Weber County to release Mr. Stillings to
Salt Lake County officials. Mr. Stillings contended that under the
Agreement it was his right to have all the detainers filed against
him by a demanding state lesoived while he was in that state.
Oregon1s failure to facilitate that resolution denied Mr. Stillings
the protection accorded him by the Agreement and the only viable
mechanism to redress that denial is to hold that the time period
began running against Salt Lake County at the same time it began
against Weber County - August 17, 1984, the date he arrived in Utah.
To ensure that both the spirit and the letter of the Agreement is
carried out courts have held that the receiving state must bear the
consequences of the improper actions of the sending state. State
v. Lincoln, 601 p.2d 641 (Colo. 1978).
Additionally, Mr. Stillings contended that the present case
closely paralled the facts in United States v. Ford, 436 U.S. 340,
56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978), and that the Ford decision mandated dismissal
of the Salt Lake County charges. Once the Agreement is triggered,
which occurred when Salt Lake County filed its detainer in Oregon,
then the 120 day period commences when the receiving State initiates
disposition of its charges.

436 U.S. at 364. Salt Lake County
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initiated disposition of its charges on September 19, 1984, by serving
its arrest warrants on Petitioner in the Weber County Jail.

It

then continued in January, 1985, what it had started on September
19, 1984, by bringing Mr. Stillings down to Salt Lake County for
various court appearances.

Salt Lake County thus took advantage of

the beneficial aspects of the Agreement by attempting to try Mr.
Stillings while he was in Utah# but is arguing that it should not be
made to live up to its responsibilities under the Agreement to try
him within 120 days.

This is precisely the situation that the Ford

case addressed and found to be an unacceptable violation of the
Agreement.

Id.

Thus# if the 120 day period did not begin to run

against Salt Lake County upon Mr. Stillings arrival in Utah on August
17, 19849 then it must have begun on September 19, 1984, when Salt
Lake County began its prosecution of Mr. Stillings by arresting him.
After hearing argument, Judge Dee denied Mr. Stillings motion
to dismiss. Mr. Stillings contends that that ruling unfairly permitted
Salt Lake County to make use of the Agreement at the expense of his
rights contained therein.
QUESTIONS OF LAW
Mr. Stillings does not contest the propriety of Judge Dee's
conclusions of law contained in Findings I.

He will assume for

purposes of this section# that those conclusions are correct. Based
on that assumption there are only two questions of law presented to
this court:
Under the facts of this case is the State of Utah, by and
through Salt Lake County, bound by the 120 day time period contained
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in Article IV(c) of the Agreement, and, if so, had that time period
run by the March 4 # 1984 trial setting?
If the 120 day time is applicable, and had run by the March
4, 1984 trial setting, should the present cases be dismissed with
prejudice?
WHY IMMEDIATE APPEAL SHOULD BE PERMITTED
The above issues can and should be decided prior to rather
than after trial on the present charges. They can be decided prior
to trial because they require no findings of fact or conclusions of
law which would have to be elicited at trial. The issues in this
Petition are completely independant of any issues that would be
raised at trial. They should be decided prior to trial so as to avoid
lengthy and expensive trials on the substantive charges. The Salt
Lake County charges involve five separate informations. Each information contains allegations of armed robbery, theft, possession of
a firearm by a restricted person and being a habitual criminal. Mr.
Stillings will move the trial court to sever the firearm count from
the others and anticipates that said motion will be granted.
v. Saunders, No. 19054 (Filed April 3, 1985).

State

Because the code

requires a separate trial also on the habitual criminal charge, it
will take fifteen (15) jury trials to fully and fairly adjudicate
the charges in the five informations. To present an adequate defense,
Mr. Stillings also anticipates moving the trial court for costs to
bring in out-of-state witnesses.

Fifteen jury trials with attendant

costs is an obvious burden on the State of Utah and on the defense,
particularly on the out-of-state witnesses.
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It is also a great

psychological burden on Mr, Stillings.

If there is any hope that

this Court would reverse Judge Dee's ruling and order the charges
dismissed, then this should occur prior to the trials rather than
after.
APPEAL WILL MATERIALLY ADVANCE TERMINATION OF
LITIGATION
If this Court reverses the District Court1s ruling the
Agreement mandates that the charges be dismissed.

That result would

obviously do more than merely materially advance termination of the
litigation.

If this Court upholds Judge Dee's ruling and these cases

are reset for trial, the defense will be forced to rethink its plea
bargaining position due to the fact that these issues constitute
the main feature of Mr. Stillings1 defense. The defense would be much
more inclined to accept a reasonable offer and that result is indeed
a material step toward terminating the cases.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner requests this Court to review Judge Dee's denial of
his Motion to Dismiss the charges in the present cases on the ground
he was not brought to trial within the 120 day period mandated by the
Agreement.

Said request is based on the reasoning contained in United

States v. Ford, supra, which dictates that Salt Lake County is bound
by the time period and that said period had run well before a trial
date was set.

The issue was timely raised below and would materially

advance the termination of litigation by either terminating the cases
by an order of dismissal or cause the petitioner to seriously reevaluate his plea bargaining position.
-8-

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //

day of October, 198 5,
f

c^U(^/
X!f6cu^j
THOMAS J. McCORMlCK
Attorney f9r Petitioner
Salt Lafce<Legal Defender Assn.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing Petition for
Permission to Appeal from an Interloctutory Order to the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111, and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this /(
of October, 1985.
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ADDENDUM D

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

vs.

:

STEVEN M. STILLINGS,

t

Defendant-Petitioner.

ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR PERMISSION
TO APPEAL FROM AN
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

Case No. 20480

:

COMES NOW the State of Utah, plaintiff-respondent
in the above-entitled matter, by and through counsel, Earl
F. Dorius, Assistant Attorney General, and hereby files
this Answer in Opposition to Defendant-Petitioner's Petition
for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order pursuant
to Rule 5(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF THE
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-5 (1953)
AS AMENDED, THAT WOULD WARRANT
DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGES PRESENTLY
PENDING AGAINST DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant-petitioner's
Statement of Facts in his Petition is correct, there has been
no violation by the prosecution of the Interstate Agreement
of Detainers (IAD), Utah Code Ann. I 77-29-5 (1953), as
amended, to justify dismissal of the charges presently
pending against him.

He asserts he was incarcerated in an Oregon
penitentiary when the Weber County Attorney requested
temporary custody of him under Article IV of the IAD
(Utah Code Ann. I 77-29-5) to try him on certain charges they
had pending against him.

He was transferred to Weber County

where he subsequently pled guilty to the charges and was
sentenced to the Utah State Prison on or about February 13,
1985.

He claims no irregularity with these proceedings under

the IAD.
However, while he was incarcerated in the Weber
County Jail# as a pre-trial detainee on the Weber County
charges, the Salt Lake County Attorneyfs Office commenced
criminal proceedings which they had pending against him.
On February 21, 1985, petitioner moved to dismiss those
charges, relying on two theories which are wholly inconsistent with each other:

(1) that Salt Lake officials had not

properly presented an Article IV, IAD request for temporary
custody to Oregon officials to secure custody to try him,
and (2) the 120-day period provided for in Article IV of
the IAD in which the prosecutors must bring him to trial had
run.

The latter argument would clearly be frivolous if the

former argument prevailed for if there had not been on Article IV
request for temporary custody, the 120-day period under
Article IV would never have commenced.

Judge David B. Dee

agreed with petitionees first theory, granted his motion to
dismiss, and ordered his return to Oregon to allow Oregon
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officials the opportunity to first review any request for
temporary custody which might then be made by Salt Lake
officials.

This ruling clearly comports with the pro-

visions of Article IV of the IAD.
Thereafter, no request for temporary custody was
ever made by Salt Lake officials because petitioner was soon
paroled by Oregon authorities and he was returned to Utah to
commence serving his prison
convictions.

sentences on the Weber County

(Nor did petitioner at any time ever attempt to

pursue any remedies available to him under Article III of the
IAD to dispose of the Salt Lake charges).
Once petitioner was incarcerated in the Utah State
Prison the terms of the IAD no longer applied, and any remedy
for prompt disposition of any other Utah charges pending
against him would lie under Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1953)
as amended.

Petitioner did not avail himself of this provision.

Salt Lake County officials soon renewed their prosecution.

Petitioner also renewed his Motion to Dismiss claiming

the 120-day period under Article IV (c) of the IAD had run.
His Motion was denied by the trial court, and it is this
ruling he seeks to appeal.
Petitioner contends that because he was "available"
to Salt Lake County during the time he was in Utah being held
on the Weber County charges, the Article IV (c) 120-day period
should be deemed to have commenced upon his arrival in Utah.
This position goes far beyond the terms of the IAD. One receiving State prosecutor's decision to prosecute charges
-3-

and obtain temporary custody of a defendant under Article IV
of the IAD is in no way binding on other prosecutors in the
receiving State.

Although Article IV (b) requires that

correctional officers in the sending State notify other
prosecutors in a receiving State (who have also lodged
detainers against an inmate) that a fellow prosecutor in
their state has requested temporary custody and that the
prisoner is being made available to that prosecutor, there
is no mandate that the other prosecutors also bring that
inmate to trial during that period.

The provision is infor-

mational only in the event the other prosecutors might choose
to file their own Article IV request for temporary custody,
and that was not done in this case.

The provision in Article

IV (b) does not create a right of disposition of charges for
a prisoner.

Article IV is the prosecutorfs half of the IAD.

Any right the petitioner might have to have the charges
disposed of lies within Article III of the IAD, and nothing
would have precluded petitioner from filing an Article III
request for disposition of the Salt Lake charges during that
period.

He did not do so and instead chose to do the opposite

by moving to dismiss the Salt Lake charges on the ground that
no proper Article IV request had been made by the Salt Lake
prosecutor.

He is thus not in a position to claim a denial

of any right he may have had to have the Salt Lake charges
brought to trial.

Whether Oregon officials did or did not
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notify other Utah officials of Petitionees availability for
prosecution under Article IV (b) accordingly should not serve
as a basis for dismissal of the Salt Lake charges.
Petitioner's latest claim that the 120 days should
be deemed to have run because "he was available to Salt Lake
County the entire time he was in Utah" also flies in the face
of his earlier argument that he was not available for prosecution and should have been returned to Oregon because an
Article IV request had not been made by Salt Lake authorities.
He prevailed on this claim and should be bound by that argument.

He should be precluded from having it both ways.
Finally, petitioner claims United States v. Mauro#

436 U.S. 340 (1978)1, mandates dismissal of the Salt Lake
charges.

He claims that once the application of the IAD

is triggered (when Salt Lake County filed its detainer with
Oregon Correctional authorities), then the 120-day period
commences when the "receiving State" initiates disposition
of its charges.

He overreads both the IAD and Mauro.

The Mauro court (in Mr. Ford's case) merely held
that the United States is a party to the IAD, and that when
the federal government demands that a State correctional
official make a State prisoner available for prosecution and
obtains custody by way of a writ of habeas corpus aj3 prosequendum,
1 Petitioner miscites the case as "United States v. Ford"
in his petition. Mr. Ford's case was joined with Mr. Flauro's
on appeal.
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it has effectually activated Article IV of the IAD and it must
bring the prisoner to trial within 120 days as required by
Article IV (c). The writ was viewed as tantamount to a "written
request for temporary custody" within the meaning of Article
IV (a). Mr. Ford, unlike petitioner, had also made repeated
requests for a speedy trial.

In petitionees case, no

semblance of any request for temporary custody was ever made
by Salt Lake officials on Oregon officials.

Thus, Article IV

was never triggered at all.
Based upon the foregoing, petitioner's Petition for
interlocutory appellate review should be denied.
DATED this

21st day of October, 1985.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact
copies of the foregoing Answer in Opposition to Petition for
Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, postage
prepaid, to Thomas J. McCormick, attorney for petitioner,
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 333 South Second East,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ^fa/

day of October, 1985.

ADDENDUM E

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH
October 2S. 198S
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
David L. Wilkinson. A.G.
Governmental Affairs Division

n.rr ?61985
State of Utah.
Plaintiff and Respondent.
v.
Steven M. Stillings.
Defendant and Appellant.

OFFICE OF
AHORNEY GENERAL

THIS DAY. Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal is denied.

Geoffrey J. Butler. Cleric

